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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the growth patterns of Don-
ald Trump’s followers (Trumpists, henceforth) on Twit-
ter. We first construct a random walk model with a
time trend to study the growth trend and the effects
of public debates. We then analyze the relationship
between Trump’s activity on Twitter and the growth
of his followers. Thirdly, we analyze the effects of such
controversial events as calling for Muslim ban and his
‘schlonged’ remark.
Introduction
From proposing mass deportation of Mexican immi-
grants to calling for banning Muslims from entering the
U.S. and more recently to saying that Hillary Clinton
‘got schlonged’ by President Obama in 2008, Donald
Trump has emerged as the most controversial candidate
in the 2016 presidential race. Yet, for all the predictions
of his fall from grace, accordingly to all the major polls,
Trump is leading the GOP presidential race by a large
margin.1
Trump’s leading position also expands into the Twit-
ter sphere, where he currently boasts of 6.58 million
followers (Figure 1). By comparison, Ted Cruz, who
enjoys the second highest Republican support, has 0.88
million followers and Marco Rubio, who regularly ranks
third in poll numbers, has 1.28 million followers. We
observe a large disparity in the number of followers
between Donald Trump and other Republican candi-
dates.2 In this work, we analyze how the political activ-
ities of Donald Trump affect public opinion and trans-
late into growth dynamics of the Trumpists.
Our goal in this paper is threefold. We first com-
pare the growth trend of the Trumpists with that of
∗This paper will be presented at the first International
Workshop on News and Public Opinion at ICWSM 2016
(May, Germany).
1For a detailed summary of the many poll results, please
see http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster/2016-
national-gop-primary.
2Data in our dataset US2016 shows that a gap of similar
magnitude also exists in the Democratic presidential race,
where Clinton ranks first, Sanders the second, and O’Malley
the third.
Figure 1: Growth of Trump followers, compared with
other major candidates
other candidates’ followers. Along the way, we shall
also evaluate the effects of the public debates on the
growth rate of the Trumpists. Second, we study the re-
lationship between Trump’s tweeting patterns and the
growth patterns of the Trumpists. Third, we quantita-
tively measure the effects of the above-cited controver-
sies.
Our study shows that while Trump enjoys the
strongest growth trend of all the major candidates, the
growth itself is not helped by his performance in Repub-
lican debates. Our study also finds that the more tweets
he posts, the faster the Trump camp grows. Lastly, we
show that the above-cited two controversial events in
Trump’s campaign may have not turned public opinion
against him.
Related Work
Our work builds upon previous research in both politi-
cal science and computer science.
Political scientists have a long history of studying the
effects of campaigns and public debates. Many stud-
ies have found that campaign and news media mes-
sages can alter voters’ behavior (Riker 1986; Iyengar
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and Kinder 1987). According to Gabriel S. Lenz, pub-
lic debates help inform some of the voters about the
parties’ or candidates’ positions on the important is-
sues (Lenz 2009). In our work, we construct a random
walk model with a time trend to estimate Trump’s per-
formance in the public debates. We also estimate how
the intensity of Trump’s tweeting activity affects the
growth of the Trumpists.
There is a burgeoning literature in computer science
on using social media data to analyze and predict elec-
tions. Research by (Tumasjan et al. 2010) finds that the
number of messages mentioning a party reflects the elec-
tion results. According to (Williams and Gulati 2008),
the number of Facebook fans constitutes an indicator
of candidate viability. (Wang, Li, and Luo 2016) use
user profile images to study and compare the social de-
mographics of Trump followers and Clinton followers.
Similarly, our work is also motivated by the high par-
allel between performance in the polls and popularity
in Twitter. (Wang et al. 2016) employ LDA to model
tweet topics and use negative binomial regression on
the number of tweet ‘likes’ to infer topic preferences of
Trump followers.
Dataset
We use the dataset US2016, constructed by us with
Twitter data. The dataset contains a tracking record
of the number of followers for all the major candidates
in the 2016 presidential race and is updated every ten
minutes. It also contains the user names, geographi-
cal locations, number of tweets posted and the profile
images of the followers for the major candidates. For
our purpose, we will focus on the dynamics of Trump’s
followers. The dataset spans the whole period between
September 18th, 2015 and December 22nd, 2015, con-
tains 12,968 observations and covers three Democratic
debates and three Republican debates. In addition,
US2016 also contains all the tweets (2113, in total) that
Trump posted during the same period. We will use
these tweets to learn Trump’s tweeting pattern. Dates
on which Trump-initiated controversies broke out are
public knowledge and we obtain them online.
Estimation Results
In this section, we present our estimation results on
Trump’s debate performance, effects of his tweeting ac-
tivity, and the effects of the above-cited controversies.
Public Debates
We assume that the number of followers follows a ran-
dom walk and that there is a time trend that repre-
sents the strength of growth. This time trend will be
affected by candidates’ performance during the public
debate and it might also deviate from the trend during
weekends when there is decreased news media activ-
ity. Meanwhile, assuming that the act of following the
candidates exhibits hourly patterns, e.g. relatively low
during late night hours, we control for the hour of the
day. Formally, we formulate the model as follows:
∆Followerst = β0 + β1∆Timet + β2Debate(D)
+ β3Debate(R) + β4Weekend
+ γ · controls+ t
where ∆Followerst is the number of new followers at pe-
riod t, ∆Timet represents the time interval, Debate(D)
is binary, denoting whether a Democratic debate is in
effect, Debate(R) denotes whether a Republican debate
is in effect, and Weekend is binary, taking value of 1 if
the time is weekend and 0 otherwise, and lastly controls
are a set of hour dummies that control for the fact that
Twitter activities are low during late night and early
morning hours.
We then estimate the coefficient vector β using OLS
for Trump and five other candidates. β1 represents the
time trend: a larger β1 represents faster growth. β2
measures the effects of Democratic debates and β3 mea-
sures the effects of Republican debates. For Trump, β3
measures his debate performance and β2 measures the
effects of Democratic debates on the growth of his fol-
lowers. Lastly, β4 represents the effects of the weekend,
when the intensity of activities on the news media is
low.
We report the results in Table 1. In terms of growth
trend, Trump clearly leads the entire presidential race.
In terms of debate performance, we find that both Car-
son and Rubio outperformed Trump in the Republican
debates. We observe that Trump is winning lots of fol-
lowers during Democratic debates.
Lastly, we find that during weekends the growth of
Trumpists tends to slow down. This “weekend” effect
is also significant for other candidates except Carson.
We posit that this “weekend” effect might be caused
by a decreased level of activity in the news media. This
suggests that news media might be playing a significant
role in the expansion of the Twitter sphere. Another
possible reason is that the general public are less re-
sponsive to the news media during the weekend.
Twitter Engagement
Motivated by the observation that Trump’s tweeting ac-
tivity exhibits a strong daily pattern, as shown in Figure
2, and by the “weekend” effect uncovered from the first
subsection, we study the relationship between Trump’s
tweeting intensity and the growth of Trumpists. To
measure intensity, we calculate the number of tweets
that Trump posted at each hour and then on each day
during our observation period. Figure 3 presents our
hourly and daily aggregation results.
To measure the effects of Trump’s tweeting intensity,
we first test whether a rise in Trump’s daily tweeting
activity increases the growth of the Trumpists. Second,
we test whether his hourly tweeting intensity increases
Trumpist growth. Since there will be a lag effect be-
tween Trump posting a tweet and someone following
Trump, here we include 8 lagged intensity values to
test for Granger causality, following (Bollen, Mao, and
Zeng 2011).
Table 1: Comparing Trump’ Performance on Twitter with Other Candidates
Clinton Sanders Biden Trump Carson Rubio
∆Time 67.50∗∗∗ 33.46∗∗∗ 10.61∗∗∗ 86.40∗∗∗ 35.54∗∗∗ 23.42∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.499) (0.0263) (1.385) (0.346) (0.107)
Democratic Debate 59.73∗∗∗ 140.9∗∗∗ 1.669∗∗∗ 235.0∗∗∗ 31.49∗∗∗ 16.17∗∗∗
(1.768) (3.691) (0.195) (10.24) (2.555) (0.789)
Republican Debate 8.109∗∗∗ 13.77∗∗∗ -1.142∗∗∗ -6.013 62.40∗∗∗ 29.73∗∗∗
(1.792) (3.741) (0.197) (10.38) (2.589) (0.800)
Weekend -11.38∗∗∗ -22.11∗∗∗ -1.187∗∗∗ -51.34∗∗∗ -0.245 -3.208∗∗∗
(0.978) (2.042) (0.108) (5.665) (1.413) (0.436)
Hour Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 7.215∗∗∗ 21.58∗∗∗ -1.329∗∗∗ 43.89∗∗∗ 10.90∗∗∗ -3.031∗∗
(2.107) (4.399) (0.232) (12.21) (3.044) (0.940)
Observations 12971 12971 12971 12968 12969 12969
Adjusted R2 0.863 0.335 0.927 0.264 0.474 0.799
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 2: Growth Patterns of the Trumpists
Baseline Day Hour
∆Time 86.47∗∗∗ 86.51∗∗∗ 86.53∗∗∗
(1.395) (1.403) (1.398)
Democratic Debate 234.3∗∗∗ 229.9∗∗∗ 233.1∗∗∗
(10.33) (10.52) (10.42)
Republican Debate -6.348 -11.73 -7.976
(10.47) (10.67) (10.55)
Weekend -50.43∗∗∗ -51.50∗∗∗ -50.34∗∗∗
(5.713) (5.834) (5.733)
Day (t) 0.591∗∗
(0.194)
Hour(t) 0.614
(1.224)
Hour (t-1) -0.0305
(1.254)
Hour (t-2) -0.686
(1.262)
Hour (t-3) -1.578
(1.249)
Hour (t-4) -2.318
(1.252)
Hour (t-5) 3.188∗
(1.256)
Hour (t-6) 1.515
(1.243)
Hour (t-7) 2.735∗
(1.254)
Hour (t-8) -0.507
(1.218)
Constant 36.71∗∗∗ 24.47∗∗∗ 34.06∗∗∗
(3.244) (5.176) (4.124)
Observations 12968 12826 12914
Adjusted R2 0.251 0.251 0.252
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figure 2: The Daily Tweeting Pattern of Donald Trump
Figure 3: Trump’s Hourly and Daily Tweeting Intensity
The estimation framework is the same as in the sub-
section on public debates, except that we now add
tweeting intensity as an explanatory variable. We
present our results in Table 2. Column 1 serves as the
baseline. Column 2 investigates the effects of Trump’s
daily tweeting intensity. Column 3 investigates the ef-
fects of his hourly tweeting activity. We find that the
number of tweets that Trump posts per day increases
the growth of the Trumpists and that such an increase is
statistically significant. We also find that hourly tweet-
ing activity will not have an effect until 5 hours later.
We interpret this as the dissemination time interval.
Effects of Controversial Remarks
Trump has proved himself the most controversial candi-
date in the 2016 presidential race. Yet, despite all the
controversies that he has surrounded himself with, at
the time of writing, Trump is by far the front-runner in
the GOP presidential race.
Our dataset US2016 is ideally suited for analyzing
the effects of these controversies on public opinion.
For this purpose, we progressively introduce two
dummy variables Muslim Ban Proposal and ‘Schlong’
Comment, which take the value 1 after the respective
occurrence of the event. Muslim Ban Proposal is 1
from December 8th onward and ‘Schlong’ Comment is
1 on Dec 22nd. The estimation framework is the same
as in the public debates subsection.
Table 3: Event Analysis
Baseline Muslim Schlong
∆Time 86.36∗∗∗ 86.37∗∗∗ 86.38∗∗∗
(1.399) (1.399) (1.399)
Democratic Debate 214.9∗∗∗ 209.6∗∗∗ 209.3∗∗∗
(10.12) (10.21) (10.22)
Republican Debate 7.895 3.553 3.314
(10.37) (10.43) (10.44)
Muslim Ban Proposal 26.26∗∗∗ 26.97∗∗∗
(6.992) (7.109)
‘Schlong’ Comment -19.03
(34.29)
Constant 22.53∗∗∗ 19.03∗∗∗ 19.06∗∗∗
(2.827) (2.976) (2.976)
Observations 12968 12968 12968
Adjusted R2 0.247 0.247 0.247
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
We present our results in Table 3. We find that
the Muslim Ban effectively boosted the growth of the
Trumpists. As a robustness check, we shorten the
time window during which the Muslim Ban Proposal
variable takes value of 1 to 10 days and 5 days
progressively. The results we obtain remain positive
and significant. By contrast, we do not find a positive
boost from the ‘Schlong’ comment. The estimated co-
efficient is negative, but it is not statistically significant.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a study on the growth patterns of
Trump followers on Twitter. We first constructed a
random walk framework to model the growth patterns.
Into the time trend, we added the public debate effects
so that we were able to evaluate Trump’s performance
with regard to attracting followers. We then evaluated
the effects of Trump’s tweeting activity on the growth
of his followers. We found that the more he tweeted the
faster his follower camp grew. Lastly, we measured the
effects of two Trump-initiated controversies. Based on
our data, neither one is hurting his campaign.
We see great promise in our work and we believe that
the rise of Donald Trump is a significant event in Amer-
ican politics. Our immediate next step is to understand
the demographics of the growing Trumpists and evalu-
ate their sentiments through, e.g., tweets.
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